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INTRODUCTION 
Properly addressing palliative care and physician-assisted 
death (PAD) is a delicate, yet complicated, and even controversial, 
issue.1 Some see PAD as a dignified choice, while others see it as 
encouraging suicide. States have begun to grapple with PAD in a 
multitude of ways, primarily through legislation.2 American law 
accords the power to prevent or regulate PAD to the states, which 
also includes an individual’s right to refuse to take  necessary 
steps to preserve his or her life.3 When a state determines how 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Roger Williams University School of Law. 
1. The pro-PAD side of the debate has mostly done away with the term 
“physician-assisted suicide” and has instead used: “hastened death,” 
“compassionate care,” “end of life option,” and “death with dignity.” See 
Joseph B. Straton, Physician Assistance with Dying: Reframing the Debate; 
Restricting Access, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 475, 476 (2006). Eliminating 
the term “suicide” provides more appeal to the public when considering this 
issue. See id. For example, legislative proposals in Rhode Island have used 
“compassionate care” when referring to this topic. See H.B. 7297, 2018 Leg., 
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018). 
2. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
3. Id. (acknowledging that a medical patient has the right to refuse 
 
499 
 500 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:499 
 
best to address PAD versus continued life-saving treatment, it is 
necessary to balance the state’s interest in maintaining and 
preserving life with the individual’s interest in autonomy.4 In 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, a landmark 
case regarding a patient’s right to die and the right to refuse 
medical treatment, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the 
“interests at stake . . . are more substantial, both on an individual 
and societal level, than those involved in a run-of-the-mine civil 
dispute.”5 States have a legitimate interest in protecting and 
preserving human life and preventing suicide, but, on the other 
side, an individual has a right to bodily autonomy, specifically, to 
have a choice to control the destiny of his or her own body.6 
Indeed, in the case of a terminally ill patient, the state’s interest 
in maintaining and preserving life directly conflicts with an 
individual’s interest in autonomy—specifically, relieving oneself 
from undue pain and suffering.7 
To understand the arguments and discussions surrounding 
PAD, one must first understand the distinction between certain 
commonly used terminology. This Comment will use the term 
“right to die” instead of “euthanasia.” The term right to die in the 
PAD context refers to individuals rationally choosing to end their 
lives after careful deliberation.8 “Euthanasia,” on the other hand, 
involves physician-made decisions that will ultimately shorten a 
patient’s life based on the belief that death would be more 
beneficial to the patient rather than the patient continuing in his 
or her present state.9 Essentially, euthanasia connotes a focus on 
the physician and the physician’s perspective, whereas right to die 
 
unwanted medical treatment). 
4. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. 
5. Id. at 283. This case primarily dealt with establishing an  
evidentiary standard. Id. A surrogate or guardian may make an end of life 
decision for another person under certain circumstances if there is “clear and 
convincing” evidence that the person wants this treatment. Id. 
6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992); 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. 
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 
1128–29, 1131–33 (1997). 
8. See Katherine A. Wingfield & Carl S. Hacker, Physicians-Assisted 
Suicide: An Assessment and Comparison of the Statutory Approaches Among 
the States, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13, 16–17 (2007). 
9. JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ARGUMENT 
AGAINST LEGALISATION 10 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
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shifts that focus to the individual’s perspective and that person’s 
individual right to make a choice regarding his or her body.10 
This Comment argues that Rhode Island should enact 
legislation allowing PAD in very specific instances related to 
terminally ill patients.11 As Part I shows, the United States 
Supreme Court has concluded that there is no constitutional right 
to PAD, but this leaves room for the states to enact PAD 
protections by statute.12 Part II demonstrates that Rhode Island’s 
current legal posture on the issue of PAD is antiquated and 
against individual interests, and thus, should be repealed and 
replaced.13 This Comment further argues that Rhode Island 
should adopt a law allowing PAD in specific circumstances for 
terminally ill patients because it is an effective way to balance the 
state’s interest in protecting its citizens and preserving life 
against an individual’s right to choose, and bodily autonomy.14 
PAD comports with a physician’s role as healer, posing no threat 
to the integrity of the medical community.15 Strict procedural 
safeguards within PAD legislation alleviate the possible risk of 
abuse or coercion, and data from Oregon, the first state to legalize 
PAD, clearly demonstrates the success of procedural safeguards in 
practice.16 Therefore, this Comment concludes that Rhode Island 
should pass legislation that is similar to the Lila Mansfield 
Sapinsley Compassionate Care Act (LMSCCA), which is a 
proposed legislation that is currently being considered by the 
Rhode Island legislature, and would give a terminally ill patient 
the right to opt for PAD if certain criteria were met.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. See id. 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See infra Part I.A–B. 
13. See infra Part II.A. 
14. See infra Part II.B.1. 
15. See infra Part II.B.2. 
16. See infra Part II.B.3. 
17. See infra Part II.C. 
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I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS REJECTED A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH 
A. Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment Does Not 
Extend to a Right to Hasten Death 
Many supporters for legalization of PAD contend that the 
right to die is protected by substantive due process and equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.18 Although PAD is not an enumerated right in the 
Constitution, the Due Process Clause is often the basis for 
protecting certain rights that are not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution, but are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”19 While the 
United States Supreme Court recognizes a constitutionally 
protected right of a competent person to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment,20 the Court refused to recognize a corresponding 
constitutional right of a terminally ill patient to choose to die with 
assistance from a physician.21 Nevertheless, the lack of a 
constitutionally protected right to PAD does not preclude the 
states from protecting that right on their own accord.22 
The question of whether the right to die and advance 
directives23 are constitutionally protected was first addressed in 
Cruzan, where the Court held that “a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
 
18. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723–24 (1997); Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797–98 (1997). 
19. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
324–25 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Snyder 
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
20. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). The 
Supreme Court has found protected liberty interests in a number of personal 
decisions determined to be essential to an individual’s personal dignity and 
autonomy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
21. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; Quill, 521 U.S. at 807–09. 
22. See infra Part II.B.; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“States are presently undertaking extensive and serious 
evaluation of physician-assisted suicide . . . . In such circumstances, the . . . 
challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . . 
liberty interests is entrusted to the laboratory of the States.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
23. “Advance directive” is defined as “[a] written declaration of health 
care decisions made in advance of incapacity.” Living Will (Advance 
directive), THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012). 
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medical treatment,” even if such treatment is lifesaving; this 
liberty interest can outweigh the legitimate state interest in 
preservation of life.24 The facts in the case presented an issue 
because a serious car accident left the patient on life-support, and 
thus, deemed incompetent to make medical decisions; her parents 
sought a court order to remove the life-support.25 The Court 
explained that an individual has a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in deciding to end her own life support, but when a 
patient is incompetent, the state’s interests at stake are more 
compelling.26 There, the removal of life-sustaining treatment by 
third parties justified the imposition of heightened evidentiary 
requirements, which further supports the position that the patient 
could have made this decision if he or she was medically 
competent to do so.27 While the Cruzan holding appears to allow 
for a broad categorization of the liberty interest involved—that 
being the right to die in general—the Court subsequently clarified 
that the right in Cruzan is narrowly defined as the 
“constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition.”28 
In Washington v. Glucksberg, plaintiffs challenged a 
Washington statute prohibiting PAD under the Due Process 
 
 
24. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79 (holding that due process does not 
require the state to repose judgment on matters concerning the right to 
refuse treatment with anyone but the patient herself). In Cruzan, Justice 
Scalia noted the “difficult, indeed agonizing, questions that are presented by 
the constantly increasing power of science to keep the human body alive for 
longer than any reasonable person would want to inhabit it.” Id. at 292 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
25. Id. at 265 (majority opinion). 
26. Id. at 281–84. 
27. Id. at 281. The Court imposed a “clear and convincing” evidentiary 
standard when a surrogate or third party makes an end of life decision for an 
incompetent patient. Id. at 284. Cruzan remained in a vegetative state on 
life-support for almost eight years before her parents came up with sufficient 
additional evidence to halt artificial nutrition and hydration. D. KELLY 
WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 94, 99 (6th ed. 2016). She died twelve days after the feeding tube 
was removed. Id. The hospital staff who had cared for her for seven years 
were deeply troubled by this outcome because they believed it would have 
been easier to  cope had she been allowed to die quickly by lethal injection.  
Id. 
28. Cruzan, 497 U.S at 284; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
722–23 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807–09 (1997). 
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Clause on the grounds that it violated the protected interest of 
individual autonomy and, like the plaintiffs in Cruzan, the right to 
hasten one’s death.29 The Glucksberg opinion  emphasized  that 
the holding in Cruzan was not solely deduced from concepts of 
bodily autonomy, but rather—as all due process cases demand— 
an examination into “our [n]ation’s history, legal traditions, and 
practices.”30 Justice Rehnquist defined the liberty interest 
narrowly, explaining that the right to assistance for suicide is not 
a value that is deeply rooted in the nation’s history.31 He noted 
that history actually points the opposite way: “for over 700 years, 
the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or 
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”32 
Moreover, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Cruzan, 
and stated that there is an important distinction between 
withdrawing life support (as was the case in Cruzan), and opting 
to take medication to end one’s own life, which ultimately becomes 
the proximate cause of death.33 PAD involves  doctors  giving 
drugs to end a life, whereas Cruzan involved taking away a life- 
giving mechanism, which resulted in the patient’s death.34 The 
law regards forcing medical treatment as the equivalent of 
battery, while assisting suicide has never received the same 
treatment.35 
In the companion case to Glucksberg, Vacco v. Quill, plaintiffs 
challenged a New York statute prohibiting PAD under the Equal 
Protection Clause.36 The contention was that it is unfair  for 
family members to be permitted to take an individual off life 
support, but that an individual cannot make that decision for his 
 
 
29. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708. 
30. Id. at 710. 
31. Id. at 710–11. 
32. Id. “The earliest American statute explicitly to outlaw assisting 
suicide was enacted in New York in 1828.” Id. at 715. 
33. Id. at 725–26. “The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of 
another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal 
protection.” Id. at 725. 
34. Id. at 725; see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–
79 (1990). 
35. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725. 
36. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796–97 (1997). Quill was argued and 
decided on the same days as Glucksberg. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 808–09. 
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or herself with PAD.37 The Court found this argument no more 
convincing than the one in Glucksberg, and upheld New York’s 
statute, concluding that banning PAD while allowing refusal of 
life-sustaining treatment did not treat patients differently from 
one another or “draw any distinctions between persons.”38 The 
Court stated, “[e]veryone, regardless of physical condition, is 
entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical 
treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.”39 
Ultimately, the Court refused to recognize a constitutionally 
protected fundamental right to determine the time and manner of 
one’s own death under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal 
Protection Clause.40 Since the liberty interest of PAD is not 
considered a fundamental right, the Constitution only requires 
that a ban on PAD be rationally related to legitimate government 
interests, such as preserving life.41 
B. States May Recognize a Right to Physician-Assisted Death 
Justice Brandeis famously stated, “[i]t is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”42 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court defers 
to the states to legalize or regulate PAD, and some states have 
begun to legally permit PAD.43 Although Glucksberg and Quill 
were decided without any dissenting opinions, the majority 
opinions in both cases leave open the option of legal protection for 
PAD at the state level, arising either under state constitutions or 
state legislative authorization; many states are taking the avenue 
 
 
37. Id. at 800. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; Quill, 521 U.S. at 800. 
41. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. In Glucksberg, the government’s 
interest included protecting medical ethics and vulnerable groups, such as 
the disabled and elderly; the court concluded that this was sufficient 
justification to pass a rational basis test. Id. at 731–32, 735. 
42. New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
43. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737; see Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 8, at 
23–44. 
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of legislative reform.44 Thus, states retain the power to regulate 
PAD, but must ensure that any new legislation is consistent with 
United States Supreme Court rulings.45 
Beginning in 1994, five states and the District of Columbia 
have exercised their right to regulate and legalize PAD through 
legislation, and one state has exercised this right by means of a 
court ruling.46 The increasing number of states that have 
expressly legalized the right to choose to die by enacting PAD 
statutes demonstrates a national shift in public opinion towards 
acceptance of this right.47 
In November 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize 
PAD when voters passed the Oregon Death with Dignity Act 
(DWDA) by a narrow margin of fifty-one percent to forty-nine 
percent.48 The modern idea of DWDA was initially met  with 
public resistance, particularly in the form of a legal injunction 
that stemmed from a constitutional challenge under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to a referendum effort to 
force repeal.49 Yet, in November 1997, Oregon voters confirmed 
their support by voting in favor of the Act a second time by a 
margin of sixty percent to forty perfect, an even larger majority 
 
44. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Privacy and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill the 
Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29, 36 (2003); see Kathryn L. Tucker, The Death 
with Dignity Movement: Protecting Rights and Expanding Options After 
Glucksberg and Quill, 82 MINN. L. REV. 923, 926 (1998) [hereinafter Tucker, 
The Death with Dignity Movement]. 
45. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). Gonzalez is  the  most 
recent Supreme Court decision to affirm the states’ authority to legalize and 
regulate PAD. Id. at 274–75. 
46. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1213 (Mont. 2009); Wingfield & 
Hacker, supra note 8, at 23–44. States that legally permit PAD include 
Oregon, Washington, Montana, Vermont, California, Colorado, and the 
District of Columbia. See infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
47. See Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 8, at 23–44. “Expressly” 
legalizing PAD, as it is used in this Comment, refers to a state affirmatively 
allowing for PAD whether it be through common law or statute. 
48. Eli Stutsman, Twenty Years of Living with the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act, 30 GPSOLO 49, 50 (2013) (describing the ballot measure that 
created the Oregon Death with Dignity Act). 
49. Id. Implementation of the DWDA was delayed by injunction until 
1997. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997), vacating 869 F. 
Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994). The Ninth Circuit found federal courts did not  
have jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims and vacated the injunction.  See 
id. 
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than the initial ballot.50 
Oregon’s DWDA became the catalyst for other states to invoke 
their right to legalize and regulate PAD. Washington voters 
approved an almost identical initiative in 2008;51 Montana 
permitted PAD by court ruling in 2009;52 Vermont passed the End 
of Life Choices Act in 2013; California passed the End of Life 
Option Act in 2015; and both Colorado and the District of 
Columbia passed legislation permitting PAD in 2016.53 
II. RHODE ISLAND SHOULD LEGALIZE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH 
A. Rhode Island’s Current Legal Posture on PAD is Outdated and 
Does Not Adequately Protect an Individual’s Interests 
Rhode Island’s common law and statutes pertaining to the 
issue of PAD should be repealed and replaced because they are 
inadequate in a crucial way—they are antiquated and contrary to 
the public interest.54 Current state law expressly prohibits a 
patient’s right to choose PAD.55 In 1996, Rhode Island adopted a 
statute specifically prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.56 The 
Rhode Island General Assembly promulgated legislative findings 
that the welfare of Rhode Island citizens requires, “vulnerable 
persons be protected from suicide and that the cost to the 
taxpayers of enforcing laws preventing assisted suicides will be 
reduced by promoting civil enforcement of such laws.”57 These 
 
50. See Lindsay N. McAneeley, Comment, Physician Assisted Suicide: 
Expanding the Laboratory to the State of Hawai’i, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 269, 
275–76 (2006). 
51. Christina White, Comment, Physician Aid-In-Dying, 53 HOUS. L. 
REV. 595, 610, 610 & n.126 (2015). 
52. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1213, 1215 (Mont.  2009)  
(affirming the lower court’s decision to permit physician-assisted suicide but 
rejecting the constitutional analysis and relying on the consent statute as a 
defense to a charge of homicide). 
53. PROCON, State-by-State Guide to Physician-Assisted Suicide, 
https://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
54. In fact, Rhode Island currently considers suicide a felony and the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court has expressly deemed it as such. Clift v. 
Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805 (R.I. 1996) (citing In re Marlene 
B., 540 A.2d 1028, 1029 (R.I. 1988)). 
55. See, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3 (2002). 
56. See id. 
57. § 11-60-1; see H.B. 8244, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996); S.B. 2558, 
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legislative findings led to the enactment of the Prevention of 
Assisted Suicide Act, which, in effect, made PAD illegal in Rhode 
Island.58 
A physician violates this statute if he or she “knowingly . . . 
[p]rovides the physical means by which another person commits or 
attempts to commit suicide; or . . . [p]articipates in a physical act 
by which another person commits  or  attempts  to  commit  
suicide . . . .”59 Notably, in order to commit the foregoing, the 
physician must do so “with the purpose of assisting another person 
to commit suicide . . . .”60 While on its face this  legislation  
appears to prohibit licensed healthcare practitioners from 
providing another person with the physical means to commit 
suicide, a closer reading reveals that there is a requisite mens rea 
for the commission of this crime: that the physician acts 
“knowingly” and with “purpose.”61 While the mens rea 
requirement may insulate doctors from liability because the state 
bears the burden of proving state of mind, this element still poses 
the risk of deterring doctors from implementing vigorous medical 
treatment in fear that their intentions will be misunderstood.62 
The prosecution must prove a physician’s intent to cause death 
and not just his intent to act; yet, if a doctor’s actions result in 
death, that intent is left to the subjectivity of jurors to decide.63 
While this is only a possible risk, it certainly is not in a patient’s 
best interest for doctors to be hesitant in making medical 
decisions.64 
Moreover, the ban on assisted suicide does not apply to a 
licensed physician who “administers, prescribes, or dispenses 
medications or procedures to relieve another person’s pain or 
discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or 
increase the risk of death,” so long as the measures taken were not 
intended to cause death.65 This permits physicians to give 
 
 
1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996). 
58. § 11-60-3 (statutorily stating physicians assisted death is illegal). 
59. Id. (emphasis added). 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. Id. 
62. Editorial, Stay Out, PROVIDENCE J., July 25, 1996, at B-06. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. 
65. § 11-60-4. 
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medication to patients with terminal conditions when the primary 
purpose of giving that medication is to alleviate pain, 
notwithstanding whether or not the medication is so powerful as 
to hasten death.66 Notably, the American Medical Association 
endorses administering pain-killing medication to terminally ill 
patients to prevent excruciating pain, even when it is known that 
this act will advance the time of death.67 The ability to deny the 
requisite intent to commit this crime creates readily available 
defenses and mitigating arguments for a physician to refute a 
possible charge.68 
The problem with this law is that the difference between 
“intending” to alleviate pain while also “knowing” it may cause 
death, as opposed to “knowingly” treating a patient for the 
“purpose” of causing death, may be unclear.69 Doctors are 
committed to their patients and may want to respect their decision 
to die with dignity, even though they may not do so under Rhode 
Island law.70 Physicians in Rhode Island now have the ability to 
engage in PAD under the guise that the purpose for the fatal dose 
of medication was merely to alleviate pain.71 Thus, some doctors 
may get away with violating the law by saying that they did not 
intend to cause death, even though they knew death could be a 
result.72 On the other hand, this provision may result in 
physicians withholding heavy doses of pain-relieving morphine— 
which can hasten a terminally ill person’s death—in fear that 
their actions will be interpreted as illegally helping patients end 
their lives, when the true intent was to relieve burdensome  
pain.73 With punishment of up to ten-years in  prison  looming 
over their heads, it seems unlikely that physicians would 
jeopardize their careers and freedom on the subjective analyses of 
witnesses, prosecutors, and jurors.74 Thus, doctors may avoid 
 
66. See id. 
67. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 750–51 (1997). 
68. See id. 
69. See § 11-60-4. 
70. See id. § 11-60-4; see also Felice J. Freyer, Doctors confront assisted 
suicide: The Rhode Island Medical Society will decide next week whether to 
support physician-assisted suicide, PROVIDENCE J., May 9, 1996, at A-1. 
71. See § 11-60-4. 
72. See id. 
73. Stay Out, supra note 62. 
74. See id. 
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alleviating pain altogether because they fear that they could be 
prosecuted or convicted.75 It is overtly against the public interest 
to have doctors who are overly-paranoid in performing their 
duties.76 Either way, the subjective standard is problematic 
because in medical practice, as opposed to law books, the 
difference between the two mental states is nearly impossible to 
distinguish.77 
Accordingly, passing laws that prohibit PAD in Rhode Island 
did not come without substantial pushback from the public— 
including doctors, patients, lawyers, and politicians.78 Doctors are 
bound by the Hippocratic Oath to “do no harm,” yet, many 
patients and doctors in Rhode Island believe that allowing a 
patient to suffer the indignities of the final stages of a terminal 
illness is doing just that: doing harm.79 Around the time these 
laws came into effect, a Brown University bioethicist stated 
“[p]eople want to know this assistance will be available, . . . even 
though the vast majority will never come to want it.”80 PAD 
imposes no obligation on patients or doctors to hasten death; to 
take that opportunity and choice away does not respect an 
individual’s interests, beliefs, or wishes.81 
 
 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 750–51 (1997). 
A doctor who fails to administer medical treatment to one who is 
dying from a disease could be doing so with an intent to harm or kill 
that patient. Conversely, a doctor who prescribes lethal medication 
does not necessarily intend the patient’s death—rather that doctor 
may seek simply to ease the patient’s suffering and to comply with 
her wishes. The illusory character of any differences in intent or 
causation is confirmed by the fact that the American Medical 
Association unequivocally endorses the practice of terminal 
sedation—the administration of sufficient dosages of pain-killing 
medication to terminally ill patients to protect them from 
excruciating pain even when it is clear that the time of death will be 
advanced. 
Id. 
78. See Freyer, supra note 70. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. “Bioethics” is defined as “the discipline dealing with the ethical 
implications of biological research and applications especially in medicine.” 
Bioethics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/bioethics (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
81. See Freyer, supra note 70. 
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Those provisions of the Rhode Island General Laws relating to 
PAD that were enacted over twenty years ago no longer comport 
with individual interests or the nation’s emerging trends on 
PAD.82 It would be more effective to adopt carefully-constructed 
legislation that allow for PAD in very limited circumstances, 
which would accomplish the dual purpose of protecting an 
individual’s interest in making choices about his or her body, 
while also balancing the state’s interest in preserving life and 
protecting vulnerable groups.83 
B. Rhode Island Should Enact a Statute That Protects an 
Individual’s Interest in Autonomy While Establishing Procedural 
Safeguards Against Abuse 
The most effective means by which to effectuate PAD is 
through the legislative process because this allows for more 
extensive fact-finding, continual development of proposed 
provisions, concentrated refinement throughout the drafting 
process, and an opportunity for meaningful commentary from 
interest groups and litigators.84  Passing a  statute would provide 
a more flexible procedure, as opposed to the restrictions 
incorporated with ballot-initiative measures or court orders, 
where any fine-tuning would then come on an ad hoc basis.85 
Strong autonomy interests and maintaining control over the 
destiny of one’s body weigh in favor of the right to PAD as an 
option.86 Indeed, many terminally-ill patients view the “death 
 
82. See supra Part I.B. 
83. See infra Part II.B.1. 
84. Tucker, The Death with Dignity Movement, supra note 44, at 931. 
85. Id. 
86. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1126. Religious arguments are beyond the 
scope of this Comment. However, it is worth noting that the Catholic Church 
is one of the greatest opponents against the recent “aid in dying” legislation 
and has contributed a great deal of financial resources to support its stance  
in an effort to defeat bills of this kind. See Kathryn L. Tucker, When Dying 
Takes Too Long: Activism for Social Change to Protect and Expand Choice at 
the End of Life, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 109, 123 (2011) [hereinafter Tucker, 
When Dying Takes Too Long]. Recent data also found that as of 2015, forty- 
four percent of the Rhode Island population identified as Catholic, which was 
the second highest percentage in the United States; thus, Catholic resistance 
to PAD legislation will likely hinder progress in Rhode Island. See Ana 
Swanson, Chart: The United States of Catholics and Protestant, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
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with dignity” movement to be about control.87 Furthermore, while 
opponents of PAD have concerns that families may coerce or put 
undue pressure on a terminally ill family member to opt for PAD, 
social interests actually support the right to PAD, particularly 
because there is no substantive evidence to support a finding that 
coercion is an issue in practice.88 The  risks of  PAD legislation 
that concern opponents of the right can be effectively addressed 
through procedural safeguards written into carefully composed 
legislation.89 A blanket prohibition against PAD  actively 
obstructs the autonomy interest in providing an option for those 
who seek a compassionate death. 
1. Individual Interests and State Interests Are Adequately Served 
by Procedures and Safeguards That Ensure Vulnerable Groups 
Are Protected from Coercion and Undue Pressure When Opting for 
PAD 
Rhode Island should adopt a tightly crafted PAD statute 
containing strict procedural safeguards because it would be an 
effective method to balance an individual’s interest in personal 
autonomy and compassionate care against the state’s interest in 
protecting vulnerable groups and preserving life. PAD should be 
allowed for terminally ill patients who are deemed capable and 
competent, whose condition has a confirmed prognosis of resulting 
in death within six months or less, and who have participated in 
multiple evaluations by at least two treating physicians.90 
Further, the patient should be required to make two oral requests 
for PAD separated by a period of at least fifteen days and should 
make a subsequent written request in the presence of two 
 
 
wonk/wp/2015/03/04/chart-the-united-states-of-catholics-and-protestants/ 
?utm_term=.c1c1dfd2dad4. 
87. See White, supra note 51, at 596 & n.8. 
88. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act 2017 Data Summary, OR. HEALTH 
AUTH.,  PUB. HEALTH DIV. 10, 11 (Feb. 9, 2018), 
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/ 
deathwithdignityact/Pages/ar-index.aspx. Coercion is a serious concern from 
a public policy standpoint, however, data suggests that procedural safeguards 
effectively combat the risk of coercion; notably, there is a lack of substantive 
evidence showing otherwise. See infra Part II.B.3. 
89. McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 270. 
90. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.995 (West, Westlaw 
through Jan. 1, 2018). 
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witnesses to ensure competency and absence of coercion.91 
Physicians should be required to inform the patient of feasible 
alternatives, and request that the patient notify his or her next of 
kin.92 This proposal properly serves the patient’s autonomy 
interests while preventing abuse.93 
The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the elderly, 
as a vulnerable group, from abuse, neglect, coercion and 
mistake.94 A concern is that PAD will create a risk of undue 
influence in end-of-life choices, specifically that individuals whose 
well-being and autonomy are already weakened by advanced age 
might opt for PAD to spare their families of the financial burdens 
involved with health-care and the emotional trauma of watching 
their loved one die.95 This state interest is especially relevant in 
Rhode Island because it has a substantial aging population which 
continues to grow.96 A recent Rhode Island Department  of  
Human Services report ranked Rhode Island fourth in the nation 
in the per capita elderly population.97 As people age, they become 
more susceptible to disease and disability; thus, a rise in the 
elderly population in Rhode Island will likely result in a dramatic 
increase in terminally ill patients.98 Elderly patients have a 
personal interest in choosing PAD because it allows them the 
opportunity to exercise self-determination and offers a “more 
humane option to those seeking a compassionate death.”99 
 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See Emily P. Hughes, Note, The Oregon Death with Dignity Act: 
Relief of Suffering at the End of Medicine’s Ability to Heal, 95 GEO. L.J. 207, 
209 (2006). 
94. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997). 
95. Id. at 732. 
96. Maureen Maigret, Aging in Community: Executive Summary Report 
June 2016, SUBCOMM. OF THE LONG TERM CARE COORDINATING COUNCIL 2 
(June 2016), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Reports/AginginComm%20Exec%20 
SummaryFinal.pdf. 
97. Rhode Island’s Senior Population . . . By the Numbers, R.I. DIV. OF 
ELDERLY AFF. (2006), http://www.dea.ri.gov/stats/ (finding Rhode Island had 
117,391 residents aged seventy and older, and 82,292 residents aged seventy- 
five and older). 
98. Research Involving Elderly Or Terminally Ill Subjects, VA. POLYTECH. 
INST. INSTITUTIONAL REV. BD., http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/elderly.htm (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2017). 
99. Katherine A. Chamberlain, Note, Looking for a “Good Death”: The 
Elderly Terminally Ill’s Right to Die by Physician-Assisted Suicide, 17 ELDER 
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Although the state’s asserted interest in prohibiting PAD is to 
protect vulnerable groups from coercion and abuse, these interests 
may not be as significant in every context or set of 
circumstances.100 While Rhode Island common law states that 
preventing suicide because of depression and coercion is a 
legitimate state interest,101 terminally ill patients who  are 
deemed competent and are seeking PAD on a voluntary basis may 
pose only a modicum of risk of coercion.102 The state interest in 
preventing abuse of vulnerable groups is satisfied if the patient 
requesting PAD is not a victim of abuse or suffering from mental 
illness.103 Justice Stevens in his Glucksberg concurrence 
acknowledged that in these instances, “the State’s legitimate 
interest in preventing abuse does not apply to an individual who is 
not victimized by abuse, who is not suffering from depression, and 
who makes a rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance in 
dying.”104 Beyond this, to support and comply with the state’s 
interest in protecting vulnerable groups, a PAD statute in Rhode 
Island should be tightly drafted with language providing for 
multiple professional checks as to the competency of a patient to 
reduce the risk of depression-triggered PAD.105 Diagnosing 
depression and recognizing a coerced patient is not an easy task, 
but hospitals’ staff include mental health workers and other 
professionals whose primary purpose is to work with terminally ill 
patients to help them cope with physical and emotional pain, and 
assess all of their treatment options.106 These checks for 
competency and voluntariness allow for a patient to exercise 
autonomy over his or her body, while still protecting the state’s 
interest in safeguarding against coercion.107 
 
 
L.J. 61, 80 (2009) (quoting Glen R. McMurry, Comment, An Unconstitutional 
Death: The Oregon Death with Dignity Act’s Prohibition Against Self- 
Administered Lethal Injection, 32 DAYTON L. REV. 441, 456 (2007)). 
100. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-1 (2002). 
101. Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A.2d 806, 808 (R.I. 1995). The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court emphasized that it “generally accept[s] that the state has an 
interest in preserving life and preventing suicide.” Id. (citations omitted). 
102. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 747 (1997). 
103. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
104. Id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
105. McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 275–80. 
106. Quill, 521 U.S. at 809 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
107. See McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 275–80. 
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PAD legislation, if properly drafted, will advance an 
individual’s interest while still appreciating the state’s interest. 
Studies from the states where PAD is legally permitted show that 
proper legislation will safeguard vulnerable groups from 
coercion.108 For example, Oregon requires a patient to  be 
suffering from terminal illness, deemed competent, and 
voluntarily express an informed desire to end his or her life on 
multiple occasions with timing requirements in order to qualify for 
PAD.109 Importantly, the aforementioned elements must be 
confirmed by a second physician, and multiple requests 
strengthen the physicians’ surety of voluntary desire for PAD all 
the more, thus, further safeguarding patients from coercion into 
choosing PAD.110 The elderly’s personal interest in exercising a 
right to PAD is compatible with the state’s interests in preserving 
life and preventing suicide because legislation would contain 
safeguards to properly regulate PAD, without undermining the 
state’s interest.111 
Ultimately, an individual’s right to personal autonomy and 
dignity justifies legalizing PAD, but the state’s interests in 
protecting its citizens and preserving life consistently serves as a 
roadblock.112 Passing a carefully constructed PAD statute is a 
valid way to balance these interests because it recognizes the 
state’s interest through procedural safeguards, but also takes into 
consideration dire cases of terminally ill patients and allows them 
to opt for PAD.113 The state’s interest is neither implicated nor 
furthered by a blanket prohibition on PAD when valid eligibility 
and procedural requirements, such as those mentioned above, are 
 
 
 
108. Chamberlain,  supra  note  99,  at  84. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
127.805 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2018). 
109. Chamberlain, supra note 99, at 86. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 84; see Lisa R. Hasday, The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text: 
A Dialogue Between Law and Medicine, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 
299, 302 (2002); see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 
793–94 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding the integrity of the medical field is not 
compromised by doctors having a right to assist terminally ill patients in 
opting to die when appropriate), overruled by Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702 (1997). 
112. McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 293–95. 
113. Id. 
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in place.114 PAD would merely afford an available option to those 
seeking to end their suffering with compassionate death.115 
2. Legalizing PAD in Rhode Island is Consistent with a 
Physician’s Role as a Healer and Does Not Undermine the Medical 
Profession 
The medical industry in Rhode Island will be able to adapt to 
the legalization of PAD without losing its integrity. United States 
Supreme Court doctrine maintains that a person has a right to 
autonomy, bodily integrity, and control of his own body; 
specifically, this principle has been extended to include autonomy 
in medical decision making.116 The law—as well as medicine—is 
constantly changing and evolving, and “experience shows that 
most doctors can readily adapt to a changing legal climate.”117 It  
is assumed that medical professionals will engage in these 
permitted practices only when deemed appropriate in their 
medical opinion, and that the integrity of the medical profession 
will be maintained.118 Accordingly, allowing PAD in Rhode Island 
would likely bring about a similar result: doctors could perform 
PAD in compliance with procedural requirements when 
appropriate, and the integrity of the medical profession would be 
unharmed.119 
Rhode Island should adopt a law allowing a terminally ill 
patient to opt for PAD because incorporating deference to patient 
autonomy reflects a nuanced perception of the goals of medicine 
and the Hippocratic Oath.120 The goals of medicine are predicated 
 
114. See McMurry, Comment, supra note 99, at 456. 
115. Id. 
116. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); see 
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
117. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 829–30 (9th Cir. 
1996). For example, following Roe v. Wade’s holding that a woman has a 
constitutional right to an abortion, the nation saw the medical profession 
quickly adapt and begin performing abortions with the ethical integrity of the 
profession remaining intact. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
118. See id. at 830. The court granted doctors the right to PAD on the 
ground that “doctors would engage in the permitted practice when 
appropriate, and that the integrity of the medical profession would survive 
without blemish.” Id. (dismissing the Oath’s implicit prohibition on 
physician-assisted suicide). 
119. See id. 
120. Hughes, Note, supra note 93, at 209. 
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on the Hippocratic Oath—the famous maxim “do no harm”—and a 
doctor’s role as a healer.121 A terminally ill patient is almost 
intuitively in discord with a doctor’s role as healer because he or 
she, by definition, cannot be healed.122 At the end of medicine’s 
ability to heal, PAD provides an option that would relieve a 
patient’s suffering when that is his or her ultimate wish.123 When 
there is no other alternative to relieve that pain, PAD is a 
legitimate way to further the medical goal of relieving patients 
from suffering and undue pain, so long as it is autonomously 
requested.124 PAD is consistent with the maxim “do no harm” 
because the patient knows his or her own limits, and it allows 
willing physicians to relieve suffering while respecting their 
patient’s autonomy.125 The patient is the only one physically 
feeling pain—not the physician, and especially not policy- 
makers.126 Thus, when a patient is diagnosed with a terminal 
disease that will inevitably result in death, the law ought to allow 
a physician to respect and defer to the patient’s autonomous  
choice about his or her own dying process.127 
Furthermore, PAD legislation merely provides an option for 
physicians willing to perform the procedure; legalizing PAD in 
Rhode Island would impose no legal obligation or duty on the 
physician to engage in such practice.128 Therefore, no medical 
professional would be required to act in disagreement with his or 
her own moral beliefs or his best medical opinion.129  Similarly, 
the physicians who do consider PAD to be consistent with their 
ethical beliefs and role as healer would be allowed to engage in 
such assistance.130 PAD allows individuals to exercise their 
 
121. Id. at 209 & n.5, 225. Medical professionals take the Hippocratic 
Oath, swearing to “‘keep [the sick] from harm and injustice’ and promise that 
they themselves will ‘remain. . .free of all intentional injustice.’” Hasday, 
supra note 111, at 302 (alterations in original). 
122. Terminally ill, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terminally%20ill (last visited 
May 6, 2018); see Hughes, Note, supra note 93, at 225. 
123. McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 270. 
124. Id. 
125. See Hughes, Note, supra note 93, at 235. 
126. See id. 
127. Id. 
128. See id. at 210. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. 
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autonomy and doctors to exercise their medical opinions without 
placing any obligations or imposing any moral judgments on 
others. Since the legalization of PAD allows terminally ill 
individuals to make autonomous decisions about their life that 
comply with their own morals and beliefs, and the prohibition of 
PAD restricts the rights of individuals by disallowing patients and 
doctors to exercise their own morals and ethics and imposing the 
beliefs of others upon them, legalization of PAD ought to 
prevail.131 
Thus, Rhode Island should legalize PAD because it is not only 
consistent with the sentiment of the Hippocratic Oath and the 
purpose of medicine, but safeguards in the statute also respect 
and defer to a physician’s moral and ethical beliefs by making 
PAD an option, not an obligation. 
3. Tightly Crafted Legislation Can Appropriately and 
Successfully Safeguard Against Perceived Risks and Feared 
Abuses of PAD 
Nineteen years of data collected and analyzed by the Oregon 
Health Authority’s Public Health Division (Public Health  
Division) supports the contention that carefully drafted legislation 
containing adequate procedural safeguards can serve to prevent, 
or at least substantially mitigate, the risk of abuse or coercion 
with respect to PAD.132 While opponents of PAD charge that it 
will be forced upon vulnerable patients (e.g., poor, uninsured, 
uneducated, elderly), data suggests the contrary.133 PAD in 
Oregon is used primarily by individuals with a baccalaureate 
education or higher.134 Notably, higher levels of education 
positively correlate to a higher percent of people who invoke PAD, 
with individuals who have a bachelor’s or higher who opt for PAD 
being forty percent more than those without a high school 
diploma.135 Further, since the DWDA’s enactment in 1997, over 
 
131. Id. at 210, 235; McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 283. 
132. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act Data summary 2016, OR. HEALTH 
AUTH., PUB. HEALTH DIV. 4, 7 (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.oregon.gov/ 
oha/PH/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/deathwithdignityact/Do 
cuments/year19.pdf [hereinafter Nineteenth Annual Report]. 
133. Id. at 8–9; see McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 280–81. 
134. Nineteenth Annual Report, supra note 132, at 8. 
135. Id. at 8, tbl. 1 (showing that after DWDA’s enactment in 1997, 46% 
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ninety percent of patients using PAD were enrolled in hospice care 
and over ninety-eight percent of those patients had healthcare 
insurance.136 A patient with health insurance is less likely to be 
subjected to coercion because their continued treatment is not 
costly to the family. 
While there is a gradually increasing trend of patients who 
opt for PAD each year, the number of patients exercising this 
option remains minimal; in 2016, there were only 204 DWDA 
prescription recipients in all of Oregon.137 This does not mean  
that all the prescription recipients ingested the drugs; in fact, the 
Public Health Division reported only 133 people who passed away 
due to ingesting the prescribed medications.138 Additionally, 
DWDA requires at least fifteen days to elapse between the 
patient’s initial request and the writing of the prescription for the 
medication, and the median reported time between the initial 
request and actual death was fifty-six days in 2016.139 Allowing a 
patient time to understand his or her options and confirm his or 
her decision without rushing the patient is general practice as a 
procedural safeguard in PAD statutes, and the prolonged time 
frame demonstrates that patients truly contemplated the 
decision.140 
The Oregon reports also show that terminally ill patients 
typically experience many end-of-life concerns, the most 
prominent being loss of autonomy, decreased ability to engage in 
enjoyable activities, and loss of dignity.141 With an integral part  
of autonomy and dignity being the ability to make one’s own 
 
of those who opted for PAD had a bachelor’s degree or higher; 27% had some 
college-level education; 22% graduated from high school; and only 6% had 
less than a high school degree). 
136. Id. (showing that 54% of patients had private healthcare coverage, 
and 44.6% had Medicare, Medicaid or other governmental insurance). 
137. Id. at 4. 
138. Id. at 5. 
139. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.850 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2018); 
Nineteenth Annual Report, supra note 132, at 11. 
140. Peter G. Daniels, An Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act: A 
Merciful End to a Terminally Ill Criminal Tradition, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 763, 
779–80 (1997). 
141. Nineteenth Annual Report, supra note 132, at 10 (according to cited 
patient responses from 1997 to 2016: 91.4% feared loss of autonomy; 89.7% 
feared decreased ability to engage in activities; and 77% feared loss of 
dignity). 
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personal decisions, the ability of a patient to be a part of his own 
end-of-life choices and decide when “enough is enough” 
demonstrates value in that patient’s autonomy.142 Therefore, the 
DWDA serves to alleviate some of a terminally ill patient’s 
concerns by incorporating respect for his or her autonomy and 
giving it deference. 
In addition, Vermont recently assigned a legislative 
commission to review Oregon’s experience since passing the 
DWDA.143 The resulting report concluded, “it is quite apparent 
from credible sources in and out of Oregon that the Death with 
Dignity Act has not had an adverse impact on end-of-life care and 
in all probability has enhanced the other options.”144 The  
Vermont study made no mention of abuse, coercion, or misuse of 
the policy.145 Notably, during 2016, no referrals were made to the 
Oregon Medical Board for failure to comply with DWDA 
requirements.146 
Oregon’s successful experience with PAD legislation does not 
necessarily translate to Rhode Island having an equivalent 
experience if it were to adopt a similar death with dignity law. 
However, stringent procedural safeguards within the PAD 
legislation would adequately serve to alleviate coercion in Rhode 
Island.147 In addition to imposing specific restrictions on the 
requesting patient, PAD legislation would require the physician to 
comply with a number of procedures as well, mainly pertaining to 
documentation and diagnoses.148 
 
 
 
142. McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 290, 292. 
143. See Robin Lunge et al., Death with Dignity Law and Euthanasia in 
the Netherlands: Factual Disputes, VT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 2–3 (2004), 
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/04Death/Death_With_Dignity_ 
Report.htm. 
144. See id. at 24. 
145. See id. 
146. Nineteenth Annual Report, supra note 132, at 8.  These 
requirements include two oral requests separated by fifteen days, a written 
request in the presence of two witnesses, confirmation of the diagnosis and 
prognosis, determination that patient is capable and competent, informing 
the patient of feasible alternatives, and requesting the patient notify his or 
her next of kin. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.810, .815, .820, .840 (West, 
Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2018). 
147. See Lunge et al., supra note 143. 
148. H.R. 7297, 2018 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018). 
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C. A Proposed Bill in Rhode Island Possesses Adequate 
Procedural Safeguards Against Coercion and Effectively Balances 
an Individual’s Interest in Autonomy with the State’s Interest in 
Preserving Life 
While Rhode Island law explicitly prohibits PAD, the state 
has previously proposed legislation that would allow for certain 
medical patients to choose to end their life, stemming from the 
mid-to-late nineties through 2018.149 For example, in 1998, a bill 
was introduced that called to repeal laws prohibiting PAD and, 
instead, would authorize and regulate it.150 
The Lila Mansfield Sapinsley Compassionate Care Act 
(LMSCCA), introduced to the Rhode Island General Assembly on 
January 25, 2018, is an example of well-crafted legislation that 
Rhode Island should pass.151 This initiative demonstrates that 
carefully drafted legislation could appropriately safeguard against 
perceived risks and feared abuses of PAD.152 The LMSCCA 
reflects changes in public perceptions over the last two decades by 
replacing “suicide” with the term “compassionate care.”153 This 
law would provide a legal mechanism whereby a terminally ill 
patient may choose to end his or her life using drugs prescribed by 
a physician.154 Under the proposed legislation, doctors who  
engage in PAD and prescribe lethal prescriptions to terminally ill 
 
 
149. See, e.g., H.R. 7918, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996); H.R. 7918, 
1998 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1998); H.R. 5507, 2015 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2015). 
150. H.R. 7918 (1998) §§ 11-60-3, -4; Id. § 23-71-1. 
151. H.R. 7297, 2018 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018).  The bill is named the  
“Lila Manfield Sapinsley Compassionate Care Act” in honor of the former 
state senator who died in 2014. She was working to craft the legislation  
when she died. Jennifer Bogdan, Bill in R.I. General Assembly would let 
terminally ill control death, PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 8, 2015 11:15, PM), 
http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20150408/NEWS/150409326. 
152. H.R. 7297. 
153. Id; see H.R. 7927. Rhode Island has rebranded “suicide”  and the  
“death with dignity” and “end of life option” terminology used in other states’ 
legislation with the term “compassionate care.” Id.; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 127.800–.890 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2018). The term 
“suicide” is often associated with one who is suffering from despair and 
irrationally takes one’s own life. See also Straton, supra note 1, at 476. A 
terminally ill patient is looking towards imminent and unavoidable death, so, 
removing the term “suicide” from the current legislation creates a more 
accurate dialogue on the issue. Id. 
154. H.R. 7297. 
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patients would be immune from civil or criminal liability, as well 
as professional disciplinary action, as long as all procedural 
safeguards stated in the statute are precisely followed.155 
Physicians, however, could not be forced to prescribe lethal 
medication to terminally ill patients under the law; physicians are 
under no duty of law to participate in PAD.156 Further, health  
care facilities would also have the right to prohibit physicians 
from prescribing lethal drugs to patients under their care.157 
These provisions defer to hospitals and physicians who may not 
want to partake in PAD by imposing no obligation, but rather, 
allowing the option.158 
Furthermore, the LMSCCA sets strict guidelines for when a 
patient can request PAD.159 It requires the patient to have a 
prognosis of a “terminal condition,” meaning an “incurable and 
irreversible disease which would, within reasonable medical 
judgment, result in death within six months or less”;160 this 
prognosis must be confirmed by a second doctor.161 Other bills 
have allowed for patients with particularly burdensome pain to 
fall within the PAD statute’s bounds, but the LMSCCA avoids 
scenarios where a prognosis may ultimately be too hard to 
consistently measure, such as chronic illnesses where the life- 
expectancy varies.162 Employing a strict requisite standard for a 
prognosis of terminally ill with six months to live may seem 
stringent, but it is easy to measure with a higher degree of 
certainty. Also, a physician must determine that the patient is 
capable of making an informed decision, the decision is voluntary, 
and the patient intends to take medication for the purpose of 
hastening death.163 
The LMSCCA also incorporates mechanisms that greatly 
reduce the chance of coercion, as its opponents charge.164 The 
 
155. Id. § 23-4.13-3(a). 
156. Id. § 23-4.13-5(a). 
157. Id. § 23-4.13-6. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. § 23-4.13. 
160. Id. § 23-4.13-2(8), (10). 
161. Id. § 23-4.13-3(a)(7). 
162. H.R. 7918, Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1998). 
163. H.R. 7297 § 23-4.13-3(a)(5). 
164. Steve Ahlquist, Talking about end-of-life options in Rhode Island, RI 
FUTURE (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.rifuture.org/end-of-life-options-ri/. 
 2018] THE RIGHT TO DIE 523 
LMSCCA is virtually identical to the Oregon Death with Dignity 
Act insofar as which patients qualify to choose PAD and the 
procedural restraints imposed on the patient and physician.165 
The most significant difference in the two acts is that Oregon’s Act 
does not require the patient to self-administer the drugs, whereas 
the LMSCCA explicitly requires  self-administration.166  The 
added requirement that a terminally ill patient administer the 
medication themselves provides an additional procedural 
safeguard, allowing further surety that the patient willfully and 
intentionally ended his or her life.167 
The LMSCCA requires the terminally ill patient to verbally 
request to be prescribed medication that can be self-administered 
for the purpose of hastening his or her death in the physical 
presence of a physician.168 After the initial request, a  patient 
must make a second request in the physical presence of the same 
physician no fewer than fifteen days after the first oral request.169 
At the time of the second request, the physician must offer the 
patient the opportunity to rescind the request.170 The fifteen-day 
waiting period and additional inquiry by the physician act as 
procedural safeguards to ensure competency and sureness of the 
patient.171 In addition to the oral requests, the  patient  must 
make a third, written and signed request to be prescribed the 
medication to self-administer for the purpose of hastening 
death.172 In order to significantly reduce the risk of coercion, this 
written confirmation requires two witnesses, and at least one of 
those witnesses must be a disinterested party.173 
 
165. H.R. 7297. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.995 (West, Westlaw 
through Jan. 1, 2018). 
166. Id.; see also White, supra note 51, at 610 n.126. 
167. H.R. 7297. 
168. Id. § 23-4.13-3(a)(1). 
169. Id. § 23-4.13-3(a)(2). 
170. Id. § 23-4.13-3(a)(3). 
171.  Daniels, supra note 140, at 779 (acknowledging the general practice  
in aid in dying statutes of prescribing a minimum amount of time a patient 
must wait between his first and second requests). 
172. H.R. 7297 § 23-4.13-3(a)(4). 
173. See id.; see also § 23-4.13-2 (defining an interested person as the 
patient’s physician, a person who is a relative of the patient by blood or by 
law, a person who knows that they would be entitled, upon the patient’s 
death, to any portion of the estate or assets, or an owner, operator, or 
employee of the health care facility where the patient is being treated). 
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While the LMSCCA prescribes numerous procedural 
safeguards and eligibility requirements for the patient and 
physician to comply with if both parties decide PAD is an option, it 
imposes no obligation on a patient to opt for PAD and no legal 
duty on a health-care facility or individual physician to perform 
PAD.174 Accordingly, neither the patient or physician would be 
bound to act contrary to their morals and beliefs.175 
The proposed legislation should be passed because it contains 
adequate procedural safeguards that provide an effective way to 
balance state interests with individual rights, is consistent with 
United States Supreme Court decisions, and is supported by 
sound policy justifications. The LMSCCA has been referred to the 
House Health, Education & Welfare Committee.176 
CONCLUSION 
Rhode Island should allow for PAD in very specific instances 
related to terminally ill patients. The United States Supreme 
Court permits the states to be the laboratories of PAD legislation 
and many states have begun to do so, evidencing a change in 
public sentiment regarding PAD on a national level. Rhode 
Island’s current legal posture on the issue is outdated and 
operates against an individual’s best interests; PAD legislation in 
Rhode Island would be an effective way to balance the state’s 
interest in preserving life and preventing suicide with an 
individual’s right to autonomy and relief from undue pain and 
suffering. PAD comports with a physician’s role as healer and 
poses no threat to the integrity of the medical community. Also, 
data suggests that adequate procedural safeguards are successful 
in preventing coercion in practice. The recent sustained activity  
in the Rhode Island General Assembly demonstrates that there is 
momentum and enthusiasm in addressing this issue. The 
LMSCCA is a great example of legislation that contains adequate 
procedural safeguards; it places no obligation on the patient or the 
physician to engage in practices that do not comport with his or 
 
174. H.R. 7297 § 23-4.13-5(a)–(c). 
175. See id. 
176. H.B. 7297. The bill’s primary sponsor is Edith Ajello, Representative 
for District 1 of Providence, Rhode Island. Representatives Ajello, O’Grady, 
Knight, Carson, and Donovan introduced the bill on January 25, 2018. See  
id. 
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her own ethical beliefs, but leaves the option available for an 
individual to make an autonomous decision that complies with his 
or her own morals and beliefs. 
